Titanic Redux a la Baltimore

 At 1:30 a.m., Mar 26, the MV Dali, a 91,128-gross-tonnage container ship, slammed into one of the concrete-and-steel support piers holding up a four-pillar structure of the Francis Scott Key Bridge spanning the Patapsco River in Baltimore, Maryland.  The support pier and its column went down immediately, and with it went much of the 1.6-mile (2.6‑kilometer) bridge, killing six maintenance workers on the bridge and possibly some drivers of vehicles passing on the bridge.  Rebuilding the bridge may require $400 million to as much as $2 billion.

Recriminations began to fly almost as quickly as the bridge fell.  There was an initial report that the ship’s captain was a Ukrainian probably angry about the slowdown of military aid to Ukraine from the United States.  A later report clarified the Ukrainian captain had served in 2016, about 8 years previously.  At the time of MV Dali’s collision with the bridge crash, the captain and all crew were Indian nationals.  (Goldin)

Hopefully, the investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board will sort out root causes and improvements to decrease the damage from such disasters in the future.  Whatever the outcome, the findings will have important results not just in Baltimore, but in ports around the world. 

Container ships have tripled in size since the Scott Key Bridge was completed in 1977 (Goldin, Syme).  That revolutionary size increase has driven down shipping costs, and those lower cost have been a major driver of increased world prosperity in the late 1900s and early 2000s.  Perhaps, port authorities should have used more of that income to upgrade regulations, infrastructure, and procedures to deal with the changes. 

For perspective on the Scott Key Bridge, consider the loss of the Titanic.  Historians have examined in detail the failures in dealing with changed technologies that made the name Titanic infamous.  In 1912, the biggest, most modern, and most luxurious passenger liner, Titanic sailed on her maiden voyage.  Because she was “virtually unsinkable,” her captain sailed at near flank speed in a cold dark night … despite warnings about icebergs.  Titanic gouged herself against an iceberg and sank in less than 3 hours.  During that time Titanic’s occupants discovered that there were not enough lifeboats for the number of people onboard … and no one had drilled in using them.  More than two thirds of the 2,200 passengers and crew died in the icy waters. 

How could they be so stupid?  Easy, they followed the past rules.  The number of lifeboats had recently been increased for ships 10,000 tons and larger.  But, ship sizes had been increasing much faster.  Titanic was 50,000 tons, so a logical change would have been to increase the number of lifeboats fivefold.  That would have been logical, but it was not required … and not done. 

Likewise, ships had banged into icebergs before but had not sunk.  Titanic was one of the new generation of ships that was faster … fast enough to sink herself. 

Business consultant Nadya Zhexembayeva has popularized the term Titanic Syndrome in which disaster results from a new set of circumstances being met by some combination of greed, arrogance, and/or incompetence (Zhexembayeva).  The Titanic sinking provides a classic metaphor for business organizations that fail to see icebergs looming in the dark night of new technology and market conditions.  Eastman Kodak dominated film photography of cameras but went bankrupt after refusing to enter the realm of digital imagery now ubiquitous in cell phones.  Nokia dominated cell phones but tumbled to a much lower status when they failed to continue innovating. 

Now, let us return to sea in Baltimore harbor.  Entering and leaving ports have always been one of the greatest threats to ship passages, as former ship masters have attested (Sharpe). These passages can only become more problematic with tripled ship sizes and with ship sizes growing larger still.  Larger ships require more time to turn, slow, and stop.  Worse for bridges, they hit obstacles with greater impact. 

Are there ways (options) to mitigate this greater danger?  Yes, there are several.

One option is rebuilding all the endangered bridges larger so the support columns are in shallower water or even on shore.  Out-of-control ships would run aground before they could hit the columns.  Problem:  rebuilding all the endangered bridges at one time would cost hundreds of billions of dollars and cost many years to implement.  It would best be done during the normal bridge replacement cycle of decades.  Scratch that one.

A second option is still pricey, but much cheaper than all new bridges.  The crucial bridge-support columns can be shielded by surrounding it with three progressively larger types of shielding:  Fenders (like car fenders); dolphins, a kind of pier consisting of pilings reinforced with steel and concrete and sometimes in the shape of cylinders that can be filled with stones; and even small islands within which each column sits.   

The Tampa Bay (Sunshine Skyway) Bridge Disaster (near St. Petersburg, Florida) demonstrated the use of dolphins.  In 1980 (3 years after the Scott Key was completed) an intense storm squall at night blinded the radar and drove a freighter into the Sunshine Skyway double span bridge.  The ship broke the support column of the closer span, dropping that span and killing 35 people.  But, the concrete and steel base of that column shielded the base of the second span.  Consequently, the second span suffered no damage.  The state of Florida applied that lesson on the replacement bridge by putting each support column on an artificial island and surrounding each island with a dolphin.  (Griggs, Neuman) 

The Betsy Ross Bridge in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania is nearly the same size as the Scott Key Bridge, and it was built around the same time.  However, it already has dolphins to shield the bridge on both the upstream and downstream sides. (Paul)

Adding more fenders, dolphins, and/or islands around the bridge support piers is cheaper than building new bridges, but it would still be expensive, and the construction would require years.  Also, how many of the existing dolphins are large enough to stop the larger container ships of today and possibly larger ships coming in future years (Conarck)?

There are other examples of ships out of control.  “Between 1960 and 2014, there were 35 major bridge collapses resulting from vessel impacts. And, 18 of those were in the US.” (Hillhouse)  The YouTube of “10 Ridiculous Ship Collisions Caught on Camera,” provides video examples of a ship (thankfully smaller than a container ship) striking a bridge in Changsha, China in July 23, 2021, as well as several other incidents caused by loss of power, power stuck on, and ship crews failing to effectively respond to obstructions. (10 Ridiculous)

As a slight digression, in Niall Ferguson’s Doom: The Politics of Catastrophe, he refers to both black swans and gray rhinos.  Black swans are unexpected events, as opposed to gray rhinos,. “… that we see rumbling toward us.”  (Ferguson, Introduction)  One could charitably say that the Titanic sinking was a black swan because there was no known sinking from an iceberg.  However, there were numerous cases of ships crashing into bridges before the Francis Scott Key bridge disaster.

A third option of increased tugboat support was demonstrated by another bridge-related event.  On the evening of April 6, less than 2 weeks after collapse of the Scott Key Bridge, another large container ship lost power while departing from New York.  The APL Qingdao lost propulsion close to the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge.  Fortunately, three tugboats were accompanying APL Qingdao, and they were able to call on three more tugs for assistance.  With help from the tugs, the Qingdao was able to anchor safely; after repairs she continued out of port.  Even if Qingdao had drifted close to one of the bridge-support columns, each is surrounded by a protective rock wall.  (Dennis, Ruiz) 

In contrast, the MV Dali was assisted by two tugboats.  Those two tugs assisted her in leaving the dock and turning for straight passage out under the bridge.  Then they left for other business.  MV Dali was thus totally bereft of tugboat assistance while her power and propulsion were intermittently failing near the bridge and the tugboats were rushing to return. (Mercogliano)

That suggests a major improvement; have more running tugboats so that tugboats could be with the ships continuously while transiting in the vicinity of any vulnerable bridges.  That might start with hiring more crew members to prevent boats being tied up at the dock due to insufficient crews.  Next, would be purchasing more tugboats for those increased crews to operate. 

A fourth option would be more inspections, and more thorough inspections of ships.  The MV Dali had already collided with a berth/quay as it was trying to exit a container terminal in 2016.  That collision resulted in structural damage requiring repairs before MV Dali could sail.  In 2023 Chilean port authorities cited MV Dali for propulsion electronics issues. (Mahoney)  She passed the Chilean post-correction inspection.  However, there could have been other problems the inspectors missed.  Container ships are self-propelled cities with electrical generating plants, computers, radios, global positioning systems (GPS), many other instruments, and many automatic safety shut-off systems.  A harbor inspection might be just two inspectors on a single day.  Many things could be missed.

Because of the limitations of time and personnel during inspections, the inspectors could have missed serious MV Dali problems.  This concern is even greater considering the ship’s previous harbor collision and its failed Chilean inspection. In retrospect, those concerns should have resulted in greater rigor of inspections before the MV Dali entered Baltimore harbor and then again before it was to exit from same. 

Another reason for more thorough inspections would be deliberate sabotage, which can produce results similar to malfunctioning equipment.  Apparently, there are a number of ways to conduct remote cyber-attacks on ships: Power can be switched off, sensors can be blinded, and controls can be jammed.  However, simple equipment malfunctions more often cause such problems.  For instance, there were some reports of MV Dali circuit breakers tripping several times while still docked in Baltimore harbor probably due to power loads from refrigerated containers.  (Weiss)  (This writer’s personal suspect number one is the startup power surge from the refrigeration units is often higher than their rated demand load, leading to flickering lights, tripping circuit breakers, and worse.) 

Terrorist sabotage is less likely due to terrorist methods of operation.  Terrorists gain recruits and funding when they can credibly take credit for a successful spectacular attack, but no group has made a credible claim about causing the collision of the MV Dali with the Scott Key Bridge.  Moreover, terrorist groups prefer to strike several targets (such as the 911 terrorists attacking both towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon) to maximize psychological impact and to succeed before the country being attacked developed defensive measures against that type of attack.  China would have the best opportunity to make a cyber attack because China has provided significant numbers of cranes and other port-operations equipment.  However, China is benefiting from sales of this equipment, and any connection to a terrorist attack would jeopardize that trade.  Hence, China has a powerful financial motive against any such sabotage. 

Malfunctioning equipment does seem plausible.  There were rumors of the Dali suffering intermittent power failures while she was docked.  In that instance the crew might well have a reason to lie because any possible revelations about their employer might leave them stranded half a world from home. 

An over-arching option five, improving management by the various port authorities, would be highly useful for balancing the options mentioned and possible others. 

In passing, several partisans did suggest that loss of the Scott Key Bridge might have been due to diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI), especially recently appointed Maryland Port Administrator commissioner Karenthia Barber whose firm is heavily involved in DEI training and consulting.  This led to angry pushback from Baltimore Maryland Mayor Brandon Scott.  (Baltimore Mayor) 

However, conservative journalist Beege Welborn of Hot Air performed actual journalism on the issue.  Welborn listed Port Authority of New York commissioners and their short biographies.  (Welborn)  None of the New York commissioners appeared to have any transportation or nautical experience; whereas one Maryland commissioners had 30 years in the Port Administration before becoming a commissioner, another had served as chief of staff for the Maryland Department of Transportation, and another who had been a Coast Guard.

It would seem that Maryland had more marine experience for its commissioners than New York … although New York had both more tugboats on scene and more shielding for the Verrazano Narrows Bridge than Maryland had for the Scott Key Bridge. 

The National Transportation Safety Board investigation may have some new explanations, but there are enough elements of history from the MV Dali and other ships to suggest that mechanical failure and lack of safety backups were the most likely causes of the Scott Key Bridge destruction.. 

As with the Titanic builders and operators, port authorities had not adopted to new conditions.  For the Titanic, the danger was icebergs; for the MV Dali, it was the ships outgrowing their bridges and channels.  But, the process of failing to heed warnings was the same.  Hopefully, as with the Titanic aftermath, improvements will vastly improve harbor and bridge safety. 

   

Conclusions

1.      The growth of transportation using steadily larger container ships has increased profits for ports but also threatens more disasters for ports, especially bridges under which the ships must pass.

2.      The cause or causes of the disaster that dropped the Francis Scott Key Bridge will require a major investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board.

3.      Pending completion of that inquiry and any differing findings, the most likely causes of the disaster would probably be mechanical failure on the MV Dali and insufficient resilience of the bridge in meeting a ship three times the size of the ships in 1977 when the bridge was built.

4.      Whatever the cause of that disaster, port authorities should order construction of sufficient additional shielding around all vulnerable bridges to protect them from out-of-control ships.

5.      The port boards and commissions around the world need to increase their technical expertise to deal with possible disaster risks with the already giant and growing size of ships they service. 

All the improvement options would require more money.  But remember, the container ships are bringing in, not just boatloads, but shiploads of money.

 

References

“10 Ridiculous Ship Collisions Caught on Camera,” Underworld, posted to YouTube Jan. 12, 2024.  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JJPxXA7mELE (Accessed May 7, 2024)

“Baltimore Mayor Rips Those Blaming Diversity Efforts for Bridge Collapse,” Newsweek, March 27, 2024.  https://www.newsweek.com/baltimore-mayor-rips-those-blaming-diversity-efforts-bridge-collapse-1884390 (Accessed July 6, 2024)

Ben Conarck, Brenna Smith, and Daniel Zawodny, “Could huge concrete barriers have averted the Key Bridge collapse? The Baltimore Banner, March 28, 2024.  https://www.thebaltimorebanner.com/key-bridge-dolphins-fender-protection-3LZVAL7HDVHBXAEF4G5LBFWZHE/ (Accessed July 6, 2024)

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Curt Devine, Casey Tolan, and Isabelle Chapman, “‘Absolutely a wake-up call’: Key Bridge tragedy has markings of 1980 Baltimore crash, but worse,” CNN, March 27,2024.  https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/27/us/key-bridge-historic-crash-invs/index.html (Accessed July 6, 2024)

Niall Ferguson, Doom: The Politics of Catastrophe, Penguin Books, 2022.  https://www.amazon.com/Doom-The-Politics-of-Catastrophe/dp/B08L9Q124K/ref=sr_1_1

Melissa Goldin, “Captain of container ship that caused Baltimore bridge collapse is Indian, not Ukrainian,” AP News, March 27, 2024.  https://apnews.com/article/fact-check-dali-captain-ukrainian-baltimore-bridge-601539523278  (Accessed July 6, 2024)

Frank Griggs, Jr., “Tampa Bay (Sunshine Skyway) Bridge Disaster,” Structure Magazine, pp. 48–50, May 2022.  https://www.structuremag.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/292205-C-HistoricStructures-Griggs.pdf  (Accessed July 6, 2024)

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